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ABSTRACT
The Malaysian mobile phone service started with only one service provider in the 1980s, 
which then increased to seven by mid 1990s due to government liberalization policies. 
Nonetheless, this number decreased to three in 2004, and this marked the beginning of 
an intense competition within the industry. Utilizing the case study and content analysis 
methodologies, we gathered data from the public domain and developed a case that 
describes strategic actions taken by members within the industry. Based on Miles and 
Snow’s business strategy typology, we analyzed the case data by answering the questions 
of “How do the industry players compete?”, and “What factors are important in shaping 
their strategies?” The research objective is to provide a conceptualization of strategic 
posturing by Malaysian mobile phone service providers. Our analysis show that the initial 
strategic moves of these companies are predominantly prospecting, and, later, analyzing, 
when the market reaches subscription saturation, and competition begins to intensify. 
Industry latecomers either arise as challengers or adopt a niche strategy as their strategic 
option. The adaptive actions of these companies are greatly influenced by institutional 
elements of the government’s policies, market situation, and rivals’ actions and responses. 
These actions are mainly tied to resources and capabilities of their large internationalized 
parent companies. Taken altogether, the perspective of adaptation, as well as the theories 
of organizational ecology and institutionalization, provides important theoretical grounds 
in explaining strategic posturing and factors that influence it.
Keywords: Strategic posturing, mobile phone 
service industry, adaptation theory, Miles and Snow 
business strategy typology, organizational ecology, 
institutionalization theory
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INTRODUCTION
The Malaysian telecommunications 
industry, which includes both fixed and 
mobile service providers, has experienced 
a very rapid growth, particularly in the last 
decade. The industry, which since early 
1990s, has been designated as a strategic 
medium to transform Malaysia into a 
developed country (Zita, 2004) is now one 
of the central structures of the country 
(Ahsanul et al., 2007). The industry’s 
combined revenues rapidly increased from 
17.4 billion ringgit in the year 2000 to 44.4 
billion ringgit in the year 2008 (MCMC, 
2010). However, beginning in late 2010, 
the industry players have increasingly 
faced various serious challenges such as the 
imminent fiercer competition in both mobile 
phone and broadband markets; threats of 
impending market saturation; spiralling 
infrastructure and technology costs; and, 
possibly, higher bargaining power of the 
suppliers. Thus, there is a need for them to 
develop a strategic posturing-defined as the 
act of strategizing to achieve competitive 
advantages to ensure business survivability 
and sustainability (Covin & Slevin, 1989). 
Given their competitive situation, examining 
these companies’ strategic posturing could 
have important theoretical, policy and 
managerial implications.
The adaptation theory suggests that 
an organization’s success depends on its 
ability to ‘adapt’ itself to changes within its 
environment. Therefore, adaptation requires 
capabilities and resources that enable 
an organization to exploit opportunities 
and reduce risks in its environment. The 
organization also needs to continuously 
evaluate its internal and external elements, 
alters its internal structure and processes, 
or influences changes to its relevant 
environmental elements so that a viable 
match exists between its internal capabilities 
and resources with the external opportunities 
and risks (Chaffee, 1985; Miles et al., 1978). 
One  of  the  impor tan t  s t ra tegy 
conceptualizations, which was developed 
based on the adaptation theory, is Miles and 
Snow’s (1978) business strategy typology. 
It describes an organization’s strategic need 
to fit its own capabilities and resources with 
opportunities and threats which exist in 
its environment, reflecting the adaptation 
theory that underlies its conceptualization 
(Chaffee, 1985).
We utilized this business strategy 
typology as our theoretical lense to achieve 
the research objective, which is to provide a 
conceptualization of strategic posturing by 
Malaysian mobile phone service providers. 
The research questions that we addressed 
are: “How do the industry players compete?” 
and “What factors are important in shaping 
their strategies?”
The organization for the rest of the 
paper is as follows: First, in brief, we 
discuss Miles and Snow’s business strategy 
typology. Then, we describe the research 
methodology utilized in this study. Next, 
we analyze the strategies adopted by the 
mobile phone service providers against our 
conceptual framework and broader theories 
of organizational strategies. This analysis is 
based on the information gathered from the 
public domain, and is presented in a form of 
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an industry development case in Appendix 
A. Lastly, we present the conclusions and 
implications for future research and practice.
MILES & SNOW BUSINESS 
STRATEGY TYPOLOGY
The adaptation theory proposes the 
importance of a firm’s ability in adapting to 
its environment. In this sense, organizational 
capabilities and resources are required to 
exploit environmental opportunities and 
overcome external threats (Chaffee, 1985; 
Miles et al., 1978). Based on this theory, 
Miles and Snow’s (1978) business strategy 
typology assumes that organizations make a 
number of choices in their efforts to manage 
their environment, including deciding on 
the markets that they want to be in, the 
products/services that they want to offer, 
the technologies that they want to adopt, as 
well as the types of operations that they want 
to implement (Parnell & Wright, 1993). In 
this regard, these strategic moves are taken 
based on evaluations of the environmental 
elements and the matching of them with 
the internal contexts of the organizations 
(McDaniel & Kolari, 1987).
This typology recommends four 
strategies, which are prospecting, defending, 
analyzing, and reacting, that can be utilized 
by an organization to compete against other 
industry rivals (Griffin, 2011; Williams, 
2005). These are summarized in Table 1.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This study utilized a combination of 
explanatory case study methodology 
and content  analysis  methodology. 
An explanatory case study design is a 
methodological procedure that begins 
with the study proposing a conceptual 
framework, as well as defining the types of 
questions and data that are appropriate for 
analysis. The conceptual framework guides 
the explanation of the empirical data, and 
in turn, these data in combination with the 
theoretical explanation provide the basis 
for generating the study’s findings. These 
findings are later corroborated with broader 
theories to generate a conceptualization 
that has a high theoretical generalizability 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007; Yin, 2009).
Based on Miles and Snow’s framework 
and the  combined methodologica l 
approaches, data on the mobile phone 
industry were gathered and then developed 
into a chronological time-based case. In this 
way, the development of the industry could 
be traced from its beginning to the present 
time (finalized data collection date was 31 
December 2010). The primary data utilized 
were information gathered from sources 
published in the public domain. The content 
analysis methodology, with its ability to 
handle numerous volumes of textual data, 
was utilized to analyze and organize the 
data into a case (Duriau, Reger, & Pfarrer, 
2007; Krippendorff, 2004; Stemler, 2001; 
Mohd Fuaad & Khairul Akmaliah, 2010). 
The data cited are indicated in the text and 
in the list of reference section.
The case was finally interpreted 
based on Miles and Snow’s typology 
and, if unfitting, other relevant strategy 
theories. The above procedures enabled the 
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TABLE 1 
Strategies under Miles & Snow business strategy typology
Strategy Characteristics
Prospector - Continually explores and searches for new market opportunities, and generally acts as 
an agent of change in the industry, and thus, is a first mover in the industry (McDaniel 
& Kolari, 1987; Miles & Snow, 1978); 
- Pushes for innovation and creativity in its operation, is always searching for new 
customers and opportunities, aims for business growth, thus is generally involved in 
higher risk activities; 
- Emphasizes the need for a firm to be the first to introduce innovative products to 
customers, and tries to seize the opportunities in identifying the present and future 
needs of its customers (Miles et al, 1978). 
Defender - Focuses on securing and safeguarding a product or a market niche (Griffin & Page, 
1996). 
- Unlike prospectors, usually do not extensively search for opportunities outside its 
focused niche (McDaniel & Kolari, 1987); 
- Concentrates on dealing in a small number of narrow product/service domains, 
serving current and well-defined customers, protecting its current market share, and 
maintaining a steady growth (Miles et al., 1978); 
- Vigorously protects its current market position and tries to maintain its hold on 
customers in a certain market niche; 
- Usually involves operating at low costs and improving the quality of its existing 
products/services (Griffin & Page, 1996).
Analyzer - Combines ‘prospecting’ and ‘defending’ strategies, in which it attempts to take full 
advantage of opportunities aimed at profitability and growth (prospecting), while 
also trying to minimize its business risks (defending) (Beekun & Ginn, 1993; Miles 
et al., 1978); 
- Strives to maintain its existing market position, while at the same time attempts to be 
innovative in the industry; 
- Closely monitors the actions of its main competitors or prospectors and quickly 
imitates them; Acts as an imitator rather than an innovator (Griffin & Page, 1996); 
Reactor - Has lack of consistent approach to strategizing (Griffin & Page, 1996; Miles et al., 
1978). 
- Usually responds to pressures in its environment only when there is a strong force 
to do so; Compared to its competitors, is more passive toward the events in its 
environment and in maintaining its market share; 
- Is aware of its environment, but generally tends to respond to events after they have 
occurred (Griffin & Page, 1996; McDaniel & Kolari, 1987).
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conceptualizing of strategic postures within 
the environment in which they occurred, and 
the identification of factors that influenced 
them, while simultaneously achieving 
theoretical generalizability.
The Malaysian telecommunications 
industry comprises sectors of telephone 
and internet services. The telephone sector 
can be generally categorized into fixed and 
mobile service subsectors. In this study, our 
analysis focused exclusively on the mobile 
phone service subsector. This industry 
segment has two groups of customer base, 
which are retail and corporate. It is important 
to note that this study concentrated primarily 
on the development of the industry/strategic 
posturing of the mobile phone service 
companies in relation to their retail markets.
CLASSIFICATION OF STRATEGIC 
MOVES OF INDUSTRY PLAYERS 
AND THEIR INFLUENTIAL 
FACTORS
Telecommunication services comprise of a 
range of services, including fixed telephone 
line, mobile phone service, as well as 
fixed and mobile broadband offerings. The 
development of the mobile phone service 
industry in Malaysia is marked by a number 
of milestones (Refer to Appendix A), and the 
trajectory of which is very much influenced 
by government policies (particularly in 
regard to the issuance of licenses to operate), 
the market needs, the capabilities and 
resources that the competitors have in hand, 
and their actions and responses to others. 
During the first 10 years (i.e. from 1984 to 
1995), the industry was monopolized by two 
players; the fixed line by TM and the mobile 
service by Celcom. Subsequently, through 
the government’s liberalization policy, the 
industry was opened up to other players, 
resulting in seven telecommunications 
players. However, financial crises and 
government’s intervention resulted in the 
number of mobile phone service providers 
being reduced to three in 2004, which 
comprised of Celcom, Maxis and DiGi. In 
2008, U-Mobile joined these three players, 
and this increased the number of players in 
the industry to four. By then, there were also 
four players in the fixed line business, but 
the sector remained monopolized by TM.
Utilizing Miles and Snow’s strategic 
typology as our framework, we present 
an analysis of the actions of mobile phone 
providers according to the types of strategy 
they have implemented. 
Prospector: In this study, we define 
prospecting strategy as an act of continuously 
innovating to capitalize on new opportunities 
with the aim of achieving firm profitability 
and growth. Maxis, Celcom and DiGi can 
be classified as prospectors. Celcom is a 
prospector since it was the first service 
provider to launch the GSM mobile phone 
service in the country in 1988, and along 
with Maxis, to offer 3G service in 2005, 
and introduce 3G broadband in 2006. Both 
Celcom and Maxis were the first to offer 
BlackBerry smartphone service packages 
in 2006. Maxis can also be classified as 
a prospector because of its utilization of 
satellite technologies (the first to have such 
utility), which was made available by its 
sister company, and it has generally been 
the most innovative company in investing 
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and improving its infrastructure. In 2009, 
Maxis became the first provider to offer its 
postpaid customers mobile phone services 
on board of certain flights, and was the first 
to bring iPhone services into the Malaysian 
market. In the same year, Maxis was also the 
first to offer its customers integrated mobile 
payment services. 
In addition, DiGi can be considered as a 
prospector for its reputation as an innovator 
within the industry, and was voted the most 
innovative company in Malaysia for three 
consecutive years. It was this innovativeness 
that contributed to the company’s success in 
achieving the 25.5% subscriber market share 
in the year 2008 compared to 19.8% in 2003. 
The increase in the DiGi’s market share 
was at the expense of Maxis (about 1%) 
and Celcom (about 6%) (MCMC, 2009b). 
DiGi was the pioneer in implementing a full 
digital network service in 1995, launching 
prepaid services in 1998, and utilizing 
ePay’s digital reload service in 1999. 
DiGi was also the first to utilize market 
segmentation strategy. These actions were 
quickly imitated by its rivals, Celcom and 
Maxis.
The accumulative innovative efforts by 
these players contributed to their companies’ 
profits and overall industry growth. DiGi’s 
account showed losses from 2003 to 2005; 
so did Celcom in 2005, but all the three 
companies were profitable in 2006, 2007, 
and 2008. The combined revenue of Celcom, 
Maxis and DiGi was about RM10 billion in 
2003. This figure increased to RM18.42 
billion in 2007, reflecting an average market 
growth revenue of about RM1.65 billion 
annually (or 17%) from 2003 to 2007. By the 
end of 2009, the mobile telecommunications 
industry’s revenue was RM26 billion, with 
RM335 million contributed by the mobile 
broadband businesses (DiGi.Com Berhad, 
2003; 2004; 2005; 2007; MCMC, 2004; 
2007b; 2007d; 2009b).
In more specific, Celcom can be 
classified as a service prospector mainly 
because it was the first telco to be awarded 
with the GSM license in Malaysia. It was 
also one of the first two licensees (along with 
Maxis) to introduce 3G broadband services. 
The introduction of Celcom’s 3G service was 
facilitated by TM, its parent company, which 
at the time, was the monopoly wholesaler 
for telecommunications infrastructure 
technologies. The introduction of its 
Blackberry product was also facilitated by 
its parent company’s collaborative networks 
with Vodafone. On the other hand, Maxis, 
which has also benefited from collaborative 
networks for its Blackberry offerings, is 
an infrastructure prospector because of 
its huge investment and main strengths in 
infrastructure installation and operation. 
This is possible since Maxis is a part of a 
resource-rich international conglomerate. 
Meanwhile, DiGi is a mixed prospector in 
that it is the top Malaysian service provider 
of prepaid service and the inventor of many 
segmented service packages. In strategizing 
its growth, DiGi has gained advantage 
in having Telenor as its parent company 
and also sister companies which had 
already implemented 3G and other relevant 
technologies in other countries. Many of 
DiGi’s top management team members, who 
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have previously been trained at its parent 
company, also lend their experiences in 
developing some of the strategies executed 
by DiGi in its operations.
In  summary,  the  mobi le  phone 
companies are able to utilize prospecting 
strategies mainly because they have the 
resources and capabilities, including the 
access to the resources and capabilities of 
their parent companies. Specifically, these 
parent companies’ huge financial resources 
and capabilities, which are earned in large 
part through internationalization, serve 
as an important foundation in lending 
appropriate resources to their subsidiaries. 
These resources include the availability 
of technology and capabilities to forecast 
technological development and change, 
and to create and sustain collaborative 
networks which are important elements for 
new technological service introduction and 
firm growth.
Defender: In this study, we define defending 
strategy as acts of protecting the current 
market share and operating in a market 
niche. Up to 2008, the industry players were 
generally prospectors and analyzers rather 
than defenders. This is mainly because the 
three main players were targeting broad 
market rather than niche market. Also, 
until 2007, the need to protect their market 
share was not a major issue as the market 
was large enough for all three players. 
While DiGi was building its market share 
from 2003 to 2008, there were still many 
Malaysians without mobile phones. The 
penetration rates of mobile phones usage 
were 43.91% in 2003, 56.68% in 2004, 
74.63% in 2005, 73.2% in 2006, 85.1% in 
2007, and 98.9% in 2008. This changed in 
2008 when the market reached subscription 
saturation, and the three companies were 
threatened by the entry of a new company, 
U Mobile, and the imminent introduction 
of the Mobile Number Portability. By the 
first quarter of 2009, the subscription rate 
had surpassed the 100% mark, which was at 
100.1%, and this figure increased to 106.2% 
by the fourth quarter of 2009. Therefore, 
starting 2008, the mobile phone companies 
have begun to divert their attention towards 
pinching each other’s customers rather than 
focusing on new market penetration.
In 2009, the mobile virtual network 
operators (MVNOs), which include XOX 
and TuneTalk, and which utilized Celcom’s 
mobile infrastructure in offering their 
services, began to enter the market. Another 
MVNO is Happy Prepaid, which is DiGi’s 
internal project that was launched at the 
end of 2007. While Happy Prepaid was 
initially targeting at new Malaysian mobile 
phone users, it changed its focus to serving 
predominantly Malay communities in 
Kelantan and Terengganu in the mid if 2009, 
areas where the company had low number 
of subscribers
Analyzer :  Analyzing s t ra tegy is  a 
combination of defending and prospecting 
strategy. More specifically, in this study, it 
is defined as the act of protecting the current 
market share and/or quickly imitating 
prospector’s strategy. In this regard, Maxis, 
Celcom and DiGi are all aggressive in using 
the analyzing strategy. There are many 
instances of the analyzing strategies utilized 
by the industry players. Both Celcom 
and Maxis launched their prepaid service 
plans following DiGi’s success in 1998, 
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and both also introduced their respective 
3G service at about the same time in the 
second quarter of 2005. Maxis offered its 
3G broadband service in September 2006, 
just after Celcom launched its service in 
mid 2006. DiGi, which did not have a 3G 
license, had applied for it at the end of 
2005, and a WiMAX license in 2006, but 
both the applications were initially rejected. 
After receiving the license in 2007, DiGi 
introduced its 3G services in February 2008 
and 3G broadband service in 2009. Once 
again, just like the launching of their 3G 
services, Maxis and Celcom introduced their 
BlackBerry services at about the same time 
at the beginning of 2006. This move was 
later followed by DiGi. Moreover, DiGi’s 
market segmentation strategy was also 
quickly emulated by Maxis and Celcom.
From 2004 to 2007, the strategy of 
protecting the market share among the 
players was not apparent, and this was 
mainly because the market was large 
enough for everyone. It was not until 
2007 and 2008 that the industry players 
started to show some defensive acts by 
pinching other companies’ market share 
due to several important developments in 
the industry. These include U-Mobile’s 
entry into the market in March 2008 and 
Mobile Number Portability’s introduction 
in October 2008, as well as mobile phone 
subscription saturation which began in late 
2008. All these events forced the three big 
companies to be defensive in protecting their 
own market shares, while prospecting over 
their competitors, thus making analyzing 
their important strategy beginning around 
2007 and 2008. Moreover, the levelling of 
the playing field with DiGi obtaining the 
3G license in 2008 also allowed for a full-
fledged analyzing strategy by all companies. 
DiGi was previously at a disadvantage 
because it was unable to offer 3G services 
for a few years (i.e. from 2006 to 2009), 
while its competitors had the ‘free hand’ to 
capture the market.
Meanwhile, the entry of the MVNOs 
in mid 2009 was not a big threat to Maxis, 
which had two MVNOs agreements in 
hand, and Celcom, which had eight MVNOs 
agreements, as the MVNOs became another 
revenue source for them. For DiGi, however, 
these were threats to be reckoned with, 
as the MVNOs were targeting mainly the 
prepaid markets, which had been DiGi’s 
domain for years.
Nevertheless, after 2008, Celcom, Maxis, 
and DiGi, are generally all true analyzers. 
They have quickly imitated prospecting acts 
by rivals, while also aggressively protecting 
their market shares. By then, all the three 
mobile phone companies have an almost 
equal composition of Average Revenue 
per User (ARPU) (combined ARPUs of 
both prepaid and postpaid services). The 
difference in the size of their market share 
is also getting smaller, and their products 
and services are getting similar in terms of 
offering and pricing.
Reactor: In this study, a reacting strategy 
involves responses by a firm to the actions 
in its environment. Our findings do not 
explicitly show any of the mobile phone 
companies utilizing this strategy. However, 
we have identified two emergent classes of 
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strategy adopted by the group of late entry 
players in the Malaysian mobile phone 
service industry, which are challenging and 
niche strategies. 
Emergent types of strategy: U Mobile is 
a threat to the big three, particularly with 
it having a 3G license. The firm, however, 
is a latecomer, and is not equal in regard to 
infrastructure/sales structure development 
to the incumbents. Nevertheless, it could 
become a bigger threat later, i.e. when its 
structures are more developed and ready. 
Since its entry, the firm has advertised the 
most among the four, and also launched 
heavy promotions, including giving free 
subscriptions to induce purchase/switching. 
Being a part of resource-rich conglomerate, 
U-Mobile has the resources to act as an 
industry challenger. Therefore, we define 
challenger as a firm that has the capability 
and resources to take on the current dominant 
market players 
Another emergent category of strategy 
is the niche market player. This strategy is 
apparent among the industry newcomers 
MVNOs. At the disadvantage of being 
industry ‘laggards’, not having a full 
license to operate services on their own, 
and operating under-developed sales and 
distribution networks, the MVNOs cannot 
be expected to act as full-fledged challengers 
to the current market leaders. Thus, the 
most suitable option for these firms is to 
focus their effort on specific segments of 
the markets (niche) and try to build depth of 
usage in those markets. An example of this 
strategy is TuneTalk’s effort in capturing ‘in-
flight’ pre-paid market through collaboration 
with its parent company, AirAsia Berhad. 
The strategies adopted by the industry 
players over time are summarized in Table 2.
The above highlights the evolutionary 
nature of strategizing among the players 
within the industry—how these players 
Table 2 


































Reactor -- -- -- -- --
Challenger -- -- -- -- U-Mobile
Niche Player -- -- -- --
XOX
MVNOs
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evolved in regard to the types of strategies 
they implemented, which enriches Miles and 
Snow’s strategic adaptive conceptualization. 
The fact that some of the companies’ 
strategic postures are adaptive (e.g. 
prospecting) indicates that some of these 
strategies are internal strategic choices, in 
which they are selected by the managers 
without them being heavily influenced by 
competitive elements (Child, 1972). On 
the other hand, the empirical data also 
underline the ecological perspective of 
strategic posturing (e.g. analyzing), in that 
the strategy implemented may be directly 
induced by rivals’ actions (environmental 
determinism) (Burgelman, 1991; Hrebiniak 
& Joyce, 1985). The tangibility and visibility 
nature of their services lend themselves to 
intense imitation, allowing isomorphism 
among these service providers in defining 
and institutionalizing themselves within 
the industry. These companies’ strategic 
posturing reflects their institutionalization 
intent and actions (Dacin, Goodstein, & 
Scott, 2002; Daft, 2010; Meyer & Rowan, 
1990). Taken together, the theories of 
adaptation, in combination with ecological 
perspective and institutionalization theory, 
are important theoretical foundations in 
explaining strategic posturing of Malaysian 
mobile phone service providers and factors 
that influence this act.
CONCLUSION
At present, the three major mobile phone 
companies (namely, Celcom, Maxis, and 
DiGi) play the role of analyzer as the mobile 
phone service market reached subscription 
saturation. However, prior to 2008, when the 
market had yet to mature, and competition 
had yet to intensify, with the Mobile Number 
Portability had yet to be introduced, and 
U Mobile and the MVNOs had yet to 
enter the market, these three companies 
were predominantly adopting prospecting 
strategies by being the first mover of many 
actions. However, the newcomer in the 
industry, U-Mobile, which is a part of a 
resource-rich international conglomerate, 
adopted a challenging strategy, while the 
new MVNOs utilized a niche strategy, 
with each focusing on a specific segment 
of the market. This is due to the fact that in 
a saturating industry, pinching competitor’s 
market share and utilizing the niche strategy 
are the main strategic options.
In summary, the mobile phone service 
companies’ strategies are shaped by the 
capabilities and resources that they have 
in hand, including access to capabilities 
and resources of their parent and sister 
companies. Specifically in a highly 
competitive technological service industry, 
strategic posturing requires huge financial 
resources, availability of infrastructure, 
t e c h n o l o g y,  a n d  s a l e s  s t r u c t u r e , 
as well as the capabilities to forecast 
technological development and change, 
develop new products and services, and 
manoeuvre around government’s policies. 
Internationalization and collaborative 
networks are important in instituting these 
resources and capabilities. Moreover, this 
study, which expands the application of 
Miles and Snow strategic typology within 
technological service context, identifies two 
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other aspects of strategic posturing; namely, 
the ‘challenging strategy’ and the ‘niche 
strategy’, in explaining the strategic actions 
taken by the players. These empirical data, 
which refined Miles and Snow’s strategic 
adaptive conceptualization, also highlight 
the importance of organizational ecological 
perspective and institutionalization theory 
in explaining the act of strategic posturing.
Understanding the factors influencing 
the companies’ growth and development 
allows policy makers to design and 
implement necessary policy instruments and 
to further promote the growth of the industry. 
However, while this study elaborates the 
mobile phone service providers’ strategies 
vis-à-vis their competitors’, and against 
some important policy interventions 
(for example, DiGi’s application for a 
3G spectrum), a full analysis of their 
responses towards government policies 
and related institutional arrangements and 
interventions are required in the future. 
Already the country’s government-backed 
monopolized backbone telecommunications 
infrastructure has been the subject of 
controversy in several industry segments, 
with it being alleged to lead to expensive 
and slow Internet connection, and sluggish 
development of mobile digital content. 
Empirical data and analysis of this matter 
are crucial in view that the industry is 
designated as a strategic vehicle in achieving 
the developed country status, and thus, 
the development of information-economy, 
in which telecommunications serve as 
important infrastructural technologies, is 
critical.
In this study, the corporate and 3G 
broadband businesses of these companies 
are not the main focus. Due to their 
importance, future studies that include a 
full analysis of the mobile phone service 
providers’ businesses to fully capture their 
competitive situation and corresponding 
actions are needed. In particular, responding 
and joining in to the recent debates which 
centred on technologies and markets of 
broadband that are major elements of 
telecommunications infrastructure of today 
and in future, is crucial (e.g., Badasyan, 
Shideler, & Silva, 2011; Gomez-Torres 
& Beltran, 2011; Madjdi & Husig, 2011; 
Thompson & Garbacz, 2011).
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The Early Years—Monopoly by State-
owned Telekom Malaysia
Telecommunications services in the form 
of telephone lines and telegraphs were 
first introduced into the country in 1920s. 
Improvements in the telecommunications 
infrastructure led to its diffused usage 
within the industrial sectors and the general 
public throughout 1950s and 1960s. Since 
1957, the phone service was operated by 
the Telecommunications Department. In 
1987, however, this government-owned 
fixed line operator was turned into a 
public-listed company under the name 
of Syarikat Telekom Malaysia Berhad 
(STMB). One year later, it formed a mobile 
phone subsidiary called STM Cellular 
Communications, which provided a global 
system of mobile communication (GSM) 
services to Malaysians. In 1990, Syarikat 
Telekom Malaysia Berhad (STMB) changed 
its name to Telekom Malaysia Berhad 
(TM) (MCMC, 2004; Mesher & Zajac, 
1997; Sivalingam, 2009; The National 
Telecommunication Policy of Malaysia, 
1994-2020, 2008). 
From 1957 to mid-1980s, only fixed 
telephone line service was available to 
Malaysians. This situation changed in 1984 
when the first mobile phone service was 
offered in the country with the launching 
of Telekom Malaysia’s ATUR mobile 
telecommunications services. In 1992, TM 
sold some of its shares in STM Cellular 
Communications to Fleet Group, which later 
sold them to TRI Group. This new owner 
changed the company’s name to Celcom 
(Mesher & Zajac, 1997; Sivalingam, 2009). 
The Implementation of Malaysian 
Telecommunications Policy—the 
Emphasis on Industry Growth
Beginning in early 1990s and through 
its National Telecommunications Policy 
(1994-2020) implementation, the Malaysian 
government started to emphasize the need for 
high growth within the telecommunications 
sector. Its aim was to transform the sector 
into one of the major vehicles to achieve 
Malaysia’s developed country status by 
2020. As a part of this policy intervention, 
licenses were given to companies involved 
in various segments of the sector, including 
mobile phones, pagers, and related services 
(Ninth Malaysia Plan, 2006-2010; The 
National Telecommunication Policy of 
Malaysia, 1994-2020, 2008; Zita, 2004). 
By 1995,  s ix more new mobile 
telecommunications service providers 
(telcos) entered the market, making the total 
number of players to seven. These service 
providers included Telekom Malaysia, 
Celcom, Maxis,  Mobikom, Mutiara 
Swisscom (later renamed DiGi), Sapura 
APPENDIX A
CASE OF MALAYSIAN MOBILE PHONE SERVICE INDUSTRY 
DEVELOPMENT
The development of the industry can be divided into several important phases, which are 
as follow: 
Strategic Posturing of Malaysian Mobile Phone Service Providers
19Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 21 (S): 1 - 34 (2013)
Digital and Time Wireless (Zita, 2009). Of 
these seven, two faced bankruptcies during 
the financial crisis of 1997 and 1998, and 
with the Malaysian government insistence, 
they had merged with other telcos with 
stronger financial standing. This reduced 
the number of telcos to five, i.e. Celcom, 
DiGi, Maxis, TMTouch and TIME. In 2003, 
TIME sold its mobile business to Maxis, 
whereas ongoing internal problems resulted 
in Celcom being acquired by Telekom 
Malaysia (Alphonse, 2004; Mesher & 
Zajac, 1997). Celcom was a public listed 
company on the Bursa Malaysia, and after 
the acquisition, Celcom became a private 
operator under Telekom Malaysia (Celcom, 
2010). 
The Rapid Industry Growth and its 
Oligopolistic Formation
By 2004, the industry had consolidated 
further into three players comprising 
Celcom, Maxis and DiGi. This was the 
result of two events: the first event was 
Celcom’s new parent company, Telekom 
Malaysia, merging Celcom with its mobile 
service subsidiary, TMTouch; and, the 
second event was DiGi’s acquisition of 
TIME (Alphonse, 2004; MCMC, 2005; 
Mesher & Zajac, 1997). This period marked 
the beginning of an intense competition 
within the industry. On the whole, as a result 
of the combined operations of Celcom and 
TMTouch under Telekom Malaysia, there 
were a total of four telecommunication 
providers in 2004: Telekom Malaysia 
(which included Celcom), DiGi, Maxis and 
TIME. Telekom Malaysia directed its effort 
on the fixed line business, while allowing its 
subsidiary, Celcom, to concentrate on the 
mobile business. Similarly, DiGi and Maxis 
were also focusing on the mobile business, 
while TIME served mainly wholesale and 
corporate mobile customers (MCMC, 2004; 
2005). 
In regard to fixed telephone line 
services, several new players joined the 
industry in late 1990s. By 2004, however, 
only TM, Maxis, TIME and DiGi were still 
running fixed line operations. This number 
was further reduced to three in 2006 when 
DiGi exited the fixed line market. In regard 
to the control of the fixed line market, by 
2003, TM held a major revenue share, 
which was at 86% in 2004; 88% in 2005; 
90% in 2007 and 2008; and 91% in 2009; 
with the remaining percentage was shared 
between TIME and Maxis (MCMC, 2004; 
2005; 2006; 2007b; 2008b; 2009b). Since 
1988, the number of mobile phone users 
was rising at an exponential rate, leading to 
it surpassing the number of fixed-line phone 
users by the year 2000 (MCMC, 2007d). 
From 2000 to 2008, the number of mobile 
phone users increased at an average rate of 
8.6% per year. By the first quarter of 2009, 
the percentage of Malaysian mobile phone 
subscriptions over the total population 
exceeded the 100% mark, which was at 
100.1% and by the end of 2009, the number 
increased further to 106.2% (MCMC, 
2009b). 
The second mobile phone service 
provider, Maxis, was a subsidiary of Usaha 
Tegas. It was established in 1993 and began 
to offer its mobile phone service in 1995. 
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The company was then listed on Bursa 
Malaysia in 2002 (Maxis Communications, 
2009). DiGi, the third mobile phone service 
provider, began its operation in 1995 as 
Mutiara Swisscom, and was the first telco in 
Malaysia to offer a fully digitalized network 
service. In December 1997, the company 
was listed on Bursa Malaysia and had its 
name changed to Mutiara Swisscom Bhd., 
and later to DiGi Swisscom Bhd. In January 
1998, DiGi became the first telco to offer the 
prepaid service to its mobile phone service 
customers. Maxis and Celcom, its two main 
industry rivals, followed suit later in the 
same year. In October 1999, DiGi entered 
into an agreement with e-Pay Malaysia to 
utilize the latter’s network of terminals to 
boost its visibility and expand its prepaid 
customer base. Within six months, in April 
2000, this move was imitated by Maxis 
and Celcom (Carlsson, 2008; Khairul 
Akmaliah, Mohd Fuaad, Shamshubaridah, 
& Hänninen, 2008). 
In  Sep tember  2001 ,  DiGi  was 
transformed into a Malaysian-based foreign-
owned mobile telco when Telenor ASA took 
over the control of its management with the 
purchase of 61% of its shares (Carlsson, 
2008). In June 2002, DiGi began offering 
its Automatic International Roaming and 
General Packet Radio Services (GPRS), 
and started collaborating with Citibank and 
MOL AccessPortal Bhd to offer an electronic 
alternative for its prepaid subscribers to buy 
their reload credits. In August 2003, DiGi’s 
mobile service subscribers increased to 
two millions, and as a part of its efforts to 
retain this growing customer base, it began 
offering a new postpaid package that can 
self-adjust the service rates. 
The Introduction of 3G Services
In 2003, Maxis and Celcom were granted 
licenses by the Malaysian government 
t o  o p e r a t e  3 G  s e r v i c e s  ( “ M a x i s 
Communications 3G Pilot Network”, 
2011). Later, in the middle of the same 
year, DiGi introduced user-downloadable 
online statements, as well as the Enhanced 
Data Rates for Global Evolution (EDGE) 
technology to its customers, which were 
parts of an improvement on its GSM 
solution (DiGi.Com Berhad, 2009b). In 
2004, Celcom intensified its marketing 
efforts, lowered its SMS rates, introduced 
cheaper starter packs, which contain the 
SIM card that was needed by subscribers 
to initiate and use its prepaid service, 
and offered upgraded versions of prepaid 
services to capture new customers. By the 
end of 2004, the subscriber market shares 
for the three players were as follows: Maxis 
41.7%, Celcom 36.1%, and DiGi 22.2% 
(MCMC, 2009b). During 2004, Maxis 
via its sister company, Binariang Satellite 
Systems, began to utilize the third MEASAT 
satellite to create data networks that enable 
it to serve Malaysian customers in diverse 
geographical areas. Its sister company had 
previously launched MEASATs 1 and 2 in 
1996) (Maxis Berhad, 2011).
In the second quarter of 2005, both 
Celcom and Maxis became the first telcos 
to introduce 3G mobile phone service 
in Malaysia (Celcom, 2010; Maxis 
Communications, 2009), and, later, in 
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mid-2006, Celcom became the first mobile 
telco to offer 3G HSDPA broadband 
service (Malaysia Broadband Overview, 
2010). In September of the same year, Maxis 
imitated Celcom’s action by offering its 3.5G 
(HSDPA) broadband service. TIMEdotcom 
was also granted a 3G license in the same 
year, thus increasing the number of license 
holder for this technology to three. Maxis 
and Celcom’s 3G broadband services, which 
targeted home and consumer users, utilized a 
3G packet-based mobile telephony protocol 
and a High Speed Downlink Packet Access 
(HSDPA) technology (Malaysia Broadband 
Overview, 2010; Maxis Communications, 
2009). By the end of 2006, Maxis and 
Celcom 3G services came in two packages: 
a) Integrated 3G services, which enable 
customers who owned devices with 3G 
capabilities to have more efficient voice and 
video communications as well as Internet 
access; and b) Modem-based 3G broadband 
services, which allow customers who used 
dongles attached to their notebooks, to 
access Internet. 
In November 2005, DiGi, which had 
yet to own a 3G license, submitted an 
application for the licence to the Malaysian 
Communication and Multimedia 
Commission (MCMC). In the same month, 
DiGi began to reduce the price of its prepaid 
starter packs, from RM9.90 to RM8.50. 
The availability of 3G services in 
Malaysia resulted in an increase in postpaid 
service subscription. Within the mobile 
phone services, the number of prepaid 
service subscriptions continued to rise 
since its introduction in 1998. By the year 
2000, the number of postpaid and prepaid 
subscriptions was almost equal. Since 2001, 
the continued growth in the number of the 
prepaid subscribers resulted in it to exceed 
that of the postpaid customers. By the end 
of 2008, the prepaid service had 80.14% 
(22.169 million) of total subscription, while 
postpaid service had 19.9% (5.544 million). 
However, the growth of the prepaid market 
began to decline in 2004, while that of 
the postpaid market accelerated, and by 
the end of 2009, the postpaid market had 
taken over 1% of the prepaid market share. 
The increase in size of the postpaid market 
could be attributed to the increase in the 
use of Internet amongst mobile phone 
users, which led to, among others, prepaid 
customers switching to postpaid service. 
Unlike prepaid customers, whose usage of 
the services were constrained by the amount 
of credit available in their account, postpaid 
customers paid their bills after utilizing the 
service, thus their service usage, including 
accessing the internet, was generally not as 
restricted (Business Monitor, 2009b; Goh, 
2008g). The increase in postpaid service 
subscription was also due to the decrease 
in price of advanced mobile devices that 
support internet connectivity, as well 
as the high availability of 3G Internet 
connections. 
Since 2006, the three mobile phone 
service companies competed fiercely in 
terms of market share, product offering, 
and pricing (MCMC, 2007d). Generally, 
a telco’s market share is measured in two 
ways; a) its revenue market share, which 
is the amount of revenues earned by each 
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company, divided by the total amount of 
revenues accumulated by all companies, 
and b) its subscriber market share, which 
is the number of subscribers of each 
company, divided by the total number of 
subscribers for all companies. 
The overall Average Revenues per 
User (ARPU), or amount of revenues 
generated by a telco over the number of 
its subscribers, for all three mobile phone 
service companies had continued to drop 
since 2003, from 241 in 2003, to 222 in 
2004, to 173 in 2005, and to 171 in 2006 
(Khairul Akmaliah & Mohd Fuaad, 2011). 
The Growth of 3G and Smartphone 
Services
In February 2006, Celcom’s parent company, 
TM Berhad, sealed a partnership deal with 
Vodafone, which enabled Celcom and its 
sister companies to access international voice 
and data roaming technologies, including 
Blackberry (Fauziah Muhtar, 2006). In the 
following month (March 2006), Maxis, 
in collaboration with Research in Motion 
(RIM), launched Blackberry solutions 
for its corporate and retail customers 
(RIM Press Release, 2006). In the same 
month (March 2006), DiGi’s 3G license 
application was turned down, which was 
probably due to it being a foreign-controlled 
telco, with Telenor-- a Norwegian-based 
telecommunications conglomerate, owning 
the majority of its shares (Sidhu, 2007). In 
April 2006, DiGi made a second bid for the 
3G license, which was again rejected, even 
though two other applicants, TimedotCom 
and MiTV (which later changed its name 
to U Mobile) were granted licenses. In July 
2006, DiGi requested for a license to offer 
Internet services using WiMAX technology 
(Goh, 2007b), however, this application, 
together with those from Celcom and 
Maxis, was also turned down. On the 
other hand, in September 2006, Celcom’s 
strategic alliance with Vodafone resulted 
in it launching a BlackBerry Enterprise 
Server, which targeted enterprise (SMEs) 
and corporate markets (Celcom to distribute 
Blackberry Pearl, 2007). In October 2006, 
DiGi introduced a new postpaid family 
plan, and a month after this launching, 
the company started its Yellow Fellow 
Coverage campaign (Carlsson, 2008). 
Even though not offering 3G and 
WiMAX services, DiGi had expanded its 
subscriber market share from 19.8% in 2003 
to 27.2% at the end of 2006, with Maxis 
and Celcom’s market share at the time were 
at 42% and 31%, respectively (MCMC, 
2009b). By the end of 2006, DiGi group 
revenue was RM3.652 billion (increased 
from RM2.884 billion in the previous year), 
and turned its operating losses (from 2003 
through 2005) into profits of RM1.09 billion 
(Goh, 2008b; Malaysia Norway Business 
Council, 2006). During the same period, 
Celcom’s revenue was RM4.4 billion, 
while Maxis’ was RM7.71 billion (MCMC, 
2007b). 
Corporate Restructuring of TM (Celcom) 
and Maxis, and the Awarding of 3G 
License to DiGi 
By mid 2007, Celcom had sealed deals 
with three mobile virtual network operators 
(MVNOs), Merchantrade Asia, REDtone 
International, and TuneTalk. In these 
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partnerships, Celcom opened its network 
infrastructure to the MVNOs to enable them 
to offer their respective mobile services. 
These arrangements not only brought in 
side revenues to Celcom, they also provided 
Celcom with the opportunity to gain more 
brand visibility, and helped the company 
maximise the usage of its network capacity 
(Raj, 2007). In June 2007, the company 
launched its Blackberry Internet Service 
smartphones to individual users, which 
was the first such service in the country 
(“Celcom to distribute Blackberry Pearl”, 
2007). 
At the 2007 Frost & Sullivan Malaysia 
Telecoms Awards, TM and Maxis were 
jointly presented the Service Provider of 
the Year Award. In April 2007, Binariang 
GSM Sdn Bhd (the parent company of 
Maxis) offered to buy back the entire 
remaining shares of Maxis for RM17.46 
million, reportedly, in its efforts to support 
its operations in India and Indonesia. 
Consequently, Maxis was delisted from 
Bursa Malaysia in July 2007. 
In November 2007, DiGi was given 
the approval by the Malaysian government 
to obtain a 3G license, transferable from 
TimedotCom. In return for its 3G license, 
the latter was to receive a 10% stake in 
DiGi, or 27.5 million shares valued at 
RM649 million. Meanwhile Telenor’s 
control of DiGi was to be reduced to 49%. 
This arrangement, which transformed DiGi 
into a Malaysian-owned business entity, 
satisfied the regulatory requirement for 
its 3G license operations (TeleGeography, 
2007). With the 3G technology upgrade, 
DiGi could improve its existing mobile 
phone services by offering video calls, and 
providing a more efficient Internet access, as 
well as introducing new Internet broadband 
services. The process of transferring the 
3G license from TimedotCom to DiGi 
was completed in January 2008, and by 
mid 2008, the share swap from DiGi to 
TimedotCom was concluded (“DiGi, Time 
trading suspended”, 2008; Goh, 2008c). 
While DiGi’s early strategy was to 
focus on prepaid customers, beginning in 
mid 2000, it began to make a vigorous push 
into the postpaid market. This organized 
move began in 2007 with the introduction 
of DiGi 1Plan (DiGi.Com Berhad, 2009b). 
In December 2007, DiGi launched its Happy 
Prepaid service as an experimental MVNO 
project by offering comparatively lower 
standard call rates, and targeting mainly 
those who have yet to use mobile phone 
service. Analysts viewed the launching of 
Happy as DiGi’s response to impending 
competitions resulted from the entry of new 
MVNOs, such as TuneTalk, which would 
move into DiGi’s prepaid market domain 
(“DiGi’s ‘Happy’ to defend”, 2007; “DiGi 
wants customers”, 2007). 
By the end of 2007, DiGi’s revenues 
continued to rise to RM4.36 billion, from 
RM3.652 in the previous year (Goh, 2008b; 
Malaysia Norway Business Council, 2006), 
while Celcom’s revenue grew from RM4.4 
billion (2006) to RM5 billion, while Maxis’ 
revenue was RM9.06 billion (MCMC, 
2007b). 
Between September 2007 and March 
2008, Telekom Malaysia Bhd (TM) 
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underwent a corporate restructuring 
effort, which resulted in TM grouping its 
businesses into two entities, TM and TM 
International. Since then, TM International 
was comprised of Celcom and TM other 
regional mobile business units. In April 
2008, TM International was listed on Bursa 
Malaysia, and changed its name to Axiata 
Berhad. Celcom, being a subsidiary of 
Axiata Berhad, was renamed as Celcom 
Axiata Berhad (Axiata Group Berhad, 
2010). In the third quarter of 2008, Celcom 
introduced BlackBerry Bold Smartphones 
and its Celcom Power Tools Mobile Email 
Plans; Celcom then had a total of 8.254 
million subscribers (Celcom, 2010). Since 
2005, Celcom’s 3G coverage had been 
expanding rapidly, and by 2010, it reported 
a 95% 3G mobile service coverage in most 
areas in Klang Valley, Johor Bahru, Melaka, 
Kulim and Penang (Celcom, 2010). 
By the end of 2007, the control for 
subscriber market share began to slowly 
reach parity for the three mobile phone 
companies, with Maxis at 42%, Celcom 
31%, and DiGi 27% (MCMC, 2007b). At 
the end of 2007, Maxis’s subscriber number 
increased to 9.7 million or 41.6% market 
share from 8.1 million subscribers (or 41.5% 
subscriber market share). Its numbers were 
4.5 million (or 40.5% market share) in 
2003, 6 million (41.7%) in 2004, and 7.9 
million (40.3%) in 2005. DiGi’s number 
of subscribers at the end of 2007 was 7.1 
million (27.5%), which increased from 
2.2 million (19.8%) in 2003 to 3.2 million 
(22.2%) in 2004, to 4.8 million (24.5%) in 
2005, and to 5.31 million (27.2%) in 2006. 
Celcom’s subscription was registered at 7.2 
million (31%) in 2007, which increased 
from 6.1 million (31.3%) in 2006, and 
6.9 million (35.2%) in 2005, 5.2 million 
(36.1%) in 2004, and 4.4 million (39.6%) 
in 2003 (MCMC, 2007b). 
Industry-wise, in 2007, the combined 
(group) revenue of Celcom, Maxis and DiGi 
was RM18.42 billion, which had increased 
from RM9.991 billion in 2003. This points 
to an average increase of market growth 
revenue of RM1.686 billion per year (or 
16.87%) from 2003 to 2007. DiGi recorded 
losses from 2003 to 2005, while Celcom 
too was in the red in 2005, but all three 
telco made profits in 2006, 2007, and 2008 
(Mohd Fuaad & Khairul Akmaliah, 2009). 
As of 2007, Malaysians mostly utilized 
mobile phone for voice calls, SMSs and 
MMSs, while other data services usage, 
including Internet access via mobile phones, 
was quite low, which was at 14% (MCMC, 
2007a; 2007c). This low utilization rate 
could be due to the use of low-end mobile 
devices among the majority of subscribers 
at that time, and for the prepaid customers, 
their mobile Internet usage was further 
constrained by the amount of prepaid credit 
they had. 
Entry of U Mobile and Implementation of 
Mobile Number Portability
In March 2008, an industry newcomer, U 
Mobile launched its 3G broadband service, 
Surf with U, and this was followed by the 
introduction of its postpaid mobile phone 
service in April 2008. Shortly thereafter, 
in July 2008, it began offering its prepaid 
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service (U Mobile, 2010a). This increased 
the number of mobile phone service 
companies in Malaysia to four, and further 
intensified their rivalry in the mobile phone 
and broadband services markets. With its 
entry, U Mobile implemented a number of 
substantial promotions, such as charging 
the lowest fee for postpaid service and 
offering a two-month free subscription for 
its 3G broadband service to capture some 
market shares from the three incumbents 
(“U Mobile launches”, 2008). In July 2008, 
which was in its fourth month of operation, 
U Mobile accumulated 100,000 combined 
subscribers for its postpaid and prepaid 
services (U Mobile, 2010a). By the end 
of July 2008, U Mobile introduced two 
additional postpaid services to attract more 
customers. 
By March 2008, DiGi’s postpaid 
customers had increased by nearly half, 
which was about twice the postpaid market 
growth rate of 21% of that time. In June 
2008, DiGi’s net profit increased by about 
19% from the preceding year to RM589 
million. According to the company, this 
growth was attributed to a greater amount 
of mobile airtime used by its subscribers, 
which was resulted from its innovative 
offerings (“DiGi first-half”, 2008). To 
maintain the growth of its postpaid market, 
in July 2008, the company introduced 
its expanded postpaid package, which 
serviced both the infrequent and the regular 
subscribers. This latest offering reflected 
its careful market segmentation, and was 
different from the earlier DiGi’s Postpaid 
1Plan package. The latter, which was offered 
to the market a year earlier, was designed 
to cater to all customers, regardless their 
demographic differences (Goh, 2008d). 
These efforts were believed to be a part of 
DiGi’s strategy in handling the threat of 
Mobile Number Portability introduction at 
the end of 2008 (Goh, 2008f). In September 
2008, as a part of its customer retention 
strategy, DiGi provided its complimentary 
RM10,000 personal accident insurance 
package to those who had been subscribing 
to it services for at least three months 
(“DiGi: Plan for 3G”, 2008). By the third 
quarter of 2008, DiGi’s percentage for the 
postpaid market share began to rise from 7% 
in 2005 to 16% (Business Monitor, 2009a).
With the impending introduction of 
Mobile Number Portability at the end of 
the 2008, by middle of that year, all mobile 
phone companies braced themselves for an 
even greater competition. As the industry 
was expecting more customer migrations 
from the prepaid service to the postpaid 
service, all mobile phone service companies 
began to aggressively offer new services 
and implement heavy promotions in their 
respective postpaid segment. Maxis started 
to repackage its postpaid plans and introduce 
a new prepaid service, called Hotlink365, 
which specifically catered the low usage 
segment. Maxis’ Hotlink365 was soon 
imitated by DiGi through the introduction 
of its new extended prepaid plan. There was 
an industry rumour circulating about Maxis’ 
plan to bring iPhone into the country. The 
newest mobile telco, U Mobile, which by 
then had attracted 100,000 subscribers, also 
started to offer three new postpaid services 
(Leong, 2008). 
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By then, DiGi had launched four 
new postpaid plans, with one offering 
subscribers, to any network at anytime, text 
messaging and free local voice calls (Leong, 
2008). DiGi had also established porting 
centers and waived the porting fees to enable 
competitors’ subscribers to easily switch to 
its services. It also opened up its 1Low Flat 
Rate to all other lines used by its subscribers. 
By October 2008, the company announced a 
44% increase in the number of its postpaid 
subscribers (850,000) from mid 2007 to mid 
2008 (DiGi.Com Berhad, 2008; 2009b; Goh, 
2008f). A month later, with the introduction 
of the Mobile Number Portability, DiGi 
assigned 1,000 staff members to market its 
services (DiGi.Com Berhad, 2009b). In the 
same month, it also began opening retail 
concept stores. All these were in addition to 
its heavy investments to upgrade its network 
infrastructure to increase service quality 
throughout 2008 (“DiGi launches”, 2008; 
Goh, 2008a).
The competition was further intensified 
when the Mobile Number Portability 
was introduced to Malaysian subscribers 
on October 15 2008. Mobile Number 
Portability, which allows subscribers to 
replacing service operators without changing 
their phone numbers, was expected to 
intensify customer-pinching and price-
cutting war within the industry (Song, 
2009a). 
In 2008, DiGi’s MVNO Happy Prepaid 
appeared to be changing its strategy from 
offering low costs prepaid to all, to providing 
services in areas where it lacked visibility. 
By 2009, Happy was re-launched in the East 
Coast states of Kelantan and Terengganu 
with the aim of doubling Happy’s market 
share by mid 2012 (Business Times, 2011). 
By December 2008, DiGi.Com Berhad, 
with its shares traded on Bursa Malaysia, 
was an investment holding firm with two 
subsidiaries: a) DiGi Telecommunications 
Sdn. Bhd. (DTSB), which was responsible 
for establishing, maintaining and providing 
telecommunications and related services; 
and b) Pay By Mobile, which handled the 
remittance of fund, and provided services 
and products that use online payment as their 
main method of transaction. DTSB, in turn, 
operated a subsidiary, DiGi Services, which 
was responsible for property management 
and renting, and other related activities. 
The other subsidiary, Djuice.Com, was at 
that time an inactive business. From 2006 to 
2008, DiGi was voted the Most Innovative 
Company in Malaysia by the Wall Street 
Journal Asia (DiGi.Com Berhad, 2008; 
2009c). 
By the end of 2008, the subscriber 
market share, with a total of 27.8 million 
subscriptions, showed a slight change in 
ownership compared to the previous year, 
with Maxis at 40% (11.1 million), Celcom 
at 31.7% (8.8 million) and DiGi at 25.5% 
(7.1 million), while U Mobile had a 2.9% 
market share (0.8 million). The ARPU 
for the three major mobile phone service 
companies figure increased to 188 in 2007, 
but decreased to 172 in 2008. From 2005 
to 2008, they also had an almost similar 
number of combined ARPU for both prepaid 
and postpaid services (Khairul Akmaliah & 
Mohd Fuaad, 2011). 
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Entry of MVNOs and Subscription 
Maturation
In the first quarter of 2009, Maxis partnered 
with Malaysia Airlines and AeroMobile to 
enable its postpaid customers to use their 
mobile phones on certain flights. At that 
time, the company also became the first 
telco to offer iPhone 3G 8GB and 16GB 
services to the Malaysian market, and this 
was followed by its introduction of iPhone 
3GS in the third quarter of the same year 
(Maxis Berhad, 2009). By late March 
2009, Celcom’s and Maxis’ market shares 
of mobile phone services were fairly stable 
at 32.5% and 42.1%, respectively, while 
DiGi recorded a small decline to 25.4%, 
compared to its percentage of the market 
share at the end of 2008 (Business Monitor, 
2009b, p. 24). As of the same period, the 
three major mobile telcos offered similar 
pricing and number of prepaid and postpaid 
service packages. 
In March 2009, U Mobile launched 
its first International Direct Dialing (IDD) 
service for its prepaid subscribers, which 
offered low call rates to fixed and mobile 
line users in selected foreign countries 
(U Mobile, 2010a; 2010b). Later in May 
2009, U Mobile introduced two postpaid 
services, one of which offered up to four 
supplementary lines, while the other allowed 
free calls within its network, at a low fee 
(U Mobile, 2009) and by October 2009, it 
launched its new 3G broadband service (U 
Mobile, 2010a).
In March 2009, DiGi launched its 
7.2Mbps 3G broadband service, which, 
at that time, was the highest access speed 
for a 3G mobile broadband available to 
subscribers in Malaysia. DiGi also offered a 
10GB monthly bandwidth to its customers at 
a lower service fee compared to other mobile 
service operators (Yeap, 2009a). In July 
2009, DiGi started offering its Blackberry 
packages to corporate and retail customers 
(DiGi.Com Berhad, 2009a). Over the years, 
DiGi continuously upgraded its prepaid 
and postpaid services, and progressively 
developed its data services, including 
its mobile-TV, -podcasts, -remittance, 
-chatting, -online music tools, and -music 
exchange amongst its customers (DiGi.Com 
Berhad, 2009b). 
In April 2009, Maxis launched its 
Hotlink Youth Club plan, which targeted 
prepaid service users among college 
students. During the second quarter of 
2009, through partnerships with Nokia, 
Visa, Maybank and Touch ‘n Go, Maxis 
introduced its integrated mobile payment 
services, which enabled customers to 
purchase and make transactions using mobile 
phone devices. In the same quarter, Maxis 
offered BlackBerry Storm smartphone to its 
customers, which enabled them to efficiently 
navigate and conveniently access Internet 
social networking sites (Maxis Berhad, 
2009). 
In May 2009, DiGi.com launched its 
3G service in Sabah and Penang as a part of 
its substantial expansion plan to enable its 
broadband service to reach a greater number 
of Malaysian customers (“Broadband 
competition intensifying”, 2010). By the 
end of June 2009, Celcom had 420,000 3G 
broadband users; Maxis 171,200, and DiGi 
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11,000 (“Cover Story..”, 2009). By the 
end of 2009, Maxis intended to double the 
number of its broadband subscribers, while 
Celcom planned to have a 120% broadband 
market growth in the same year (“Celcom 
targets 120% growth”, 2009; Song, 2009b). 
As Maxis and Celcom had launched their 
3G broadband services in 2006, they were 
able to build a substantial size of customer 
base before DiGi and U Mobile were able 
to do so. Moreover, there were also wireless 
Wi-Fi and WiMAX service providers, and 
wired operators in the broadband market, 
which also competed against the three 
mobile telcos. 
Moreover, at that time, many existing 
broadband customers were hand-cuffed 
by a 12-month contract when subscribing 
to a particular service. This made the 
potential subscriber switching costs steep, 
thus making it difficult for new broadband 
providers to penetrate the market. In the 
case of DiGi, however, with Telenor as its 
parent company, it could take advantage 
on the latter’s know-how in running 3G 
networks in other countries (“DiGi CEO 
Johan Dennelind”, 2009; “DiGi: Mobile 
communication”, 2008). U Mobile, the other 
3G latecomer, also had a strong backer, as it 
was a part of a resource-rich conglomerate. 
The two WiMAX broadband players, P1 and 
REDtone, were also belonged to resource-
rich holding companies, respectively. 
In October 2009, Maxis launched its 
‘mobile money transfer service’, which 
was jointly operated with Western Union, 
to allow its 11 million subscribers to send 
money directly to accounts in foreign 
countries using their mobile phone. In 
November 2009, DiGi introduced Turbo 3G 
services, which improved the quality of voice 
and SMS transmissions and Internet access 
for its subscribers. By then, its 3G Internet 
PC broadband service had attracted nearly 
30,000 customers, but it was still hampered 
by transmission coverage problems. The 
company’s coverage was limited to about 
59% of the Klang valley area, and less 
than 50% of the country geographical area 
(Leong, 2009; Siti Sakinah, 2009).
In mid 2009, several new Mobile Virtual 
Network Operators (MVNOs) began offering 
their mobile phone services. These services 
were provided via telecommunications 
networks supported by the established 
telcos, and each of these MVNOs aimed 
to be a niche player within its own market 
segment. For examples, XOX Com, which 
began operation in May 2009, planned to 
turn one million Malaysian ethnic Chinese 
youth into its customers, while TuneTalk, 
another MVNO had a goal of attracting 
400,000 users, specifically migrant workers 
and International Direct Dialing customers 
(“New mobile operator”, 2009; Sidhu, 
2009; 2010; “Tune Talk eyeing”, 2009; 
Zam, 2009). The other two MVNOs were 
REDtone and Merchantrade, with the former 
offering its postpaid plan to enterprise 
(SMEs) and corporate customers, while 
the latter providing prepaid international 
direct dialling (IDD) call services. These 
four MVNOs were dependent on Celcom 
to provide them with network infrastructure. 
In this regard, being the service wholesaler, 
Celcom received a certain percentage of fees 
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from the MVNOs’ businesses. At this point 
of time, Maxis’ MVNOs had yet to launch 
their services. Therefore, unlike Celcom 
and Maxis, DiGi did not gain any advantage 
from the entry of MVNOs. Instead, these 
new players posed a certain level of threat to 
its business, especially in the prepaid market 
(Axiata Group Berhad, 2010). 
All mobile phone companies, however, 
faced increasing infrastructure and 
operations costs, which involve maintaining 
and upgrading telecommunications 
infrastructure, such as telecommunications 
towers, switching units and other required 
hardware and software. These costs 
require mobile phone companies to have 
a solid financial standing to support their 
future growth. Moreover, the increasing 
convergence of mobile and Internet 
technologies and fierce competition with 
competing broadband technologies might 
also pose operational difficulties to these 
companies in the future. On the other hand, 
this technology convergent may also open 
new opportunities for them to expand their 
operations. 
An important instance is the integrated 
3G service market, which has a high 
growth potential mainly due to the reduced 
price of  3G-enabled mobile phone 
devices and smartphones. This in turn 
allows more mobile phone subscribers to 
purchase them and utilize the 3G and other 
advanced services provided by mobile 
phone companies. This, combined with the 
industry players’ continuous upgrading of 
their 3G infrastructures, enables a faster 
and more reliable mobile transmission 
and higher value-added services, to their 
customers. The reduction of phone price and 
the upgrading of 3G services significantly 
improve customers’ service experiences and 
emotional attachments. 
This is already evident in the increase 
in the number of 3G subscriptions in the 
past several years. While only 1.56 million 
(6.7%) users of the total 23.3 million 
mobile phone users subscribed to the 3G 
services by the end of 2007, this number 
had increased to 4.4 million users (15.9%) of 
the overall 27.713 million users by the end 
of 2008 (Goh, 2008e; MCMC, 2008a). Of 
these 4.4 million 3G users, 46% (2 million) 
were postpaid users, while the remaining 
54% or 2.4 million users were prepaid 
subscribers (MCMC, 2008a). As the number 
of customers who were able to access more 
advanced services increased, the overall 
data services usage also grew, which could 
translate into the increase in the mobile 
phone companies’ revenues. 
In November 2009, Maxis offered 
its shares again on Bursa Malaysia (after 
its withdrawal in July 2007), and listed 
itself as Maxis Bhd. In March 2010, TM 
launched its UniFi High Speed Broadband 
Service; therefore, by March 2010, within 
the consumer/retail market, there were 
many broadband service providers, which 
comprised both the wired and wireless 
providers. Their broadband services 
however, were very closed substitutes. 
Besides, there were broadband players 
which focused exclusively on corporate 
customers. By the end of 2008, the demand 
for fixed (wired) broadband was the highest 
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among broadband service subscribers, 
with about 76% (1.3016 million users) of 
them (1.7181 million users) using it, while 
the rest, or about 24% (0.4165 million), 
favoured the wireless service. By the end of 
2009, however, wired broadband users had 
decreased to 59%, while wireless broadband 
subscribers jumped to 41% from a total of 
2.6203 million users (MCMC, 2009a). As 
mobile phone companies only had licenses 
to run 3G broadband services and not other 
types of broadband technologies, they 
as a group do not have the upper hand in 
controlling the broadband service industry.
By the end of 2009, the total number 
of mobile phone subscribers reached 30.4 
million. At that time, Maxis’ subscription 
was 12 million customers at 39.6% market 
share, which increased from 11.1 million 
(40%) in 2008. In the same period, U 
Mobile’s recorded 300,000 customers or 
1% market share, in comparison to 800,000 
(2.9%) in 2008 (MCMC, 2009b). DiGi 
subscribers were 7.7 million or 25.4%, 
in comparison to 7.1 million (25.5%) in 
2008, while Celcom’s number was at 10.4 
million (34.2%), which increased from 8.8 
million (31.7%) in 2008 (MCMC, 2009a; 
2009b). By the end of 2009, mobile phone 
subscriptions surpassed the 100% mark, at 
106% (MCMC, 2010). 
Late 2010 and Beyond
At the end of 2010, Celcom, with about 
120,000 subscribers, was the leader in 
the BlackBerry smartphone market in 
Malaysia. In that same year, Celcom had 
already launched three (out of four) new 
BlackBerry devices and introduced its new 
prepaid plan, Xpax BlackBerry Messenger. 
It also became the first to introduce other 
smartphone packages, including Nokia 
C3, LG Optimus 7, and the latest Windows 
Phone 7. Moreover, the company had also 
offered a new incentive scheme that focused 
on building depth of customer usage and 
increasing the duration of their subscription, 
aimed at increasing subscriptions of its 
postpaid and prepaid customers. By the 
end of 2010, Celcom had achieved a 40% 
increment in its gross prepaid subscription, 
mainly through the increase in its foreign 
workers segment. By then, Celcom’s four 
MVNOs business revenue contribution 
had almost double their contribution in the 
previous year, along with the number of 
their subscriptions, ending the year with 
about 600,000 customers (Axiata Group 
Berhad, 2010). 
Celcom’s revenue increased from 
RM6.3 billion in 2009 to RM6.9 billion 
by the end of 2010, which it associated to 
its mobile broadband business. By then, 
its mobile phone subscription increased 
by 10% to 11.2 million subscribers, which 
the company attributed to its focus on 
continuous improvements of its networks 
infrastructure, execution of the segmented 
marketing strategy (including youth and 
foreign workers), as well as improvements 
in its sales and distribution channel and 
its customer service quality. At the end of 
2010, Celcom announced its transformation 
plan that aimed toward supporting its goal 
to become the number one provider of 
mobile voice and broadband services in 
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Malaysia. This plan was expected to involve 
strengthening its networks collaborations, 
extending its intelligence and branch 
networks with the target of improving 
customer experience, as well as expanding 
its enterprise (SMEs) and corporate 
businesses (Axiata Group Berhad, 2010). 
Meanwhile, by the end of 2010, Maxis 
reported that its strategic plan for 2011 was a 
three-pronged approach, which involved (a) 
maximizing its voice business; (b) securing 
data access leadership and penetration; 
and (c) delivering products and services 
beyond telecommunications. In view of 
the stagnating voice revenues and the high-
growth of Internet content and services, 
starting in 2009, Maxis planned to transform 
itself from a “mobile service company” 
into an “integrated communications service 
provider”. In executing this plan, among 
others, Maxis pledged to improve its 
performance, make investments to sustain 
its revenue streams, including investing in 
areas of networks and operations; form and 
strengthen collaborations with key entities 
within the ‘integrated communications 
ecosystems’; and implement prudent 
financial management (Maxis Berhad, 
2010). 
In December 2010, Maxis entered into 
a collaborative deal with TM to provide 
High Speed Broadband Service. At that 
time, Maxis recorded a mobile phone 
subscriptions of 14 million, reported to be 
the largest subscription base in the industry; 
of this number, 40.1% subscriptions were 
prepaid, while 47.5% were postpaid (Maxis 
Berhad, 2010). Maxis’ mobile phone 
services achieved a 42% revenue market 
share (in comparison to 42% in 2009, 
and 43% in 2008). Utilizing its 3G/HSPA 
network services, which had covered 76% of 
Malaysia, and its 2G networks, accessible by 
95% of the population, it had able to gather 
600,000 broadband subscriptions (Maxis 
Berhad, 2010).
Meanwhile in 2010, DiGi was voted 
by Asian Sustainability Rating as the best 
company in Malaysia, the number one 
telco in Asia, and the 11th best company in 
Asia. DiGi was also ranked among the top 
ten companies of the year by a Malaysian 
business magazine. By the end of 2010, 
DiGi captured a market share of 25.6% in the 
mobile phone market. In its Annual Report 
2010, DiGi described its growth was driven 
mostly by the increase in its, a) customer 
acquisition; b) data (Internet and broadband 
services) and smartphone offerings; and c) 
prudent cost saving measures. Through its 
continuous investment, DiGi achieved a 
50% mobile Internet and broadband network 
coverage of populated areas by the end of 
that year. It aimed to increase its coverage 
to 60% by the end of 2011. 
By the end of 2010, DiGi had 211,000 
broadband subscribers and 8.8 million 
mobile phone customers, with 4.2 million 
of them were 3G mobile Internet users. By 
then DiGi’s ARPU for postpaid was RM83, 
prepaid was RM46, and their combined 
figure was RM52. It had also achieved 
50% population coverage for its 3G/HSPA 
and had begun collaboration with Celcom 
to increase and upgrade its transmission 
networks. DiGi’s Group revenue for 2010 
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was RM5.4 billion, an increase of 10.1% 
compared to the previous year (DiGi.Com 
Berhad, 2010; 2011).
In 2010, DiGi also conducted a number 
of innovative marketing campaigns in its 
prepaid and postpaid mobile phone services, 
which enabled it to boost its customer 
base. DiGi had also entered into several 
collaborative partnerships to boost its 
growth, and, according to the company, this 
could lead to the overall growth of Internet 
and broadband industry in the country. In 
going forward, DiGi considered mobile 
Internet as the driving factor of its growth, 
and to exploit this opportunity, it planned 
to focus on improving the quality of its 
mobile Internet and broadband services, 
strengthening its sales and distribution 
channels, introducing new products and 
services, and implementing a differentiation 
strategy to enable provision of good 
experience to its customers (DiGi.Com 
Berhad, 2010). 
Meanwhile, by the end of 2010, 
U-Mobile, which remained a private 
operation, had revamped its prepaid 
service packages, charging a flat rate for all 
domestic calls, and lowering its SMS rates 
(U Mobile, 2010a; “U Mobile’s new prepaid 
rates”, 2010). By then, the company had also 
upgraded its broadband offering to Dual-
Carrier High-Speed Packet Access (HSPA) 
(U Mobile, 2010a; 2010c; 2010d; 2010e). 
These actions indicated the company’s 
stronger move into the industry. 
By the end of 2010, the competition in 
the Malaysian telecommunications market 
was getting ever more intense, with the 
mobile phone service providers offering 
similar products and comparable pricing. 
The market was getting crowded with the 
entry of U Mobile and the MVNOs, as well 
as other new broadband players. Moreover, 
mobile phone subscriptions had increased 
further to 117% compared to late 2009, 
which was at 106%, while the number of 
broadband subscription was at 55.6%, which 
was also an increase from 38% at the end of 
second quarter 2010 (MCMC, 2010). 
As consumer subscription reached 
maturation, it can be expected that the 
enterprise (SMEs) and corporate market 
in both mobile voice and Internet services 
will play a greater role in contributing 
toward the companies and industry growth 
(“Cover Story..”, 2009). Over the years, 
all three mobile phone companies had 
employed various strategies and had heavily 
marketed their mobile solutions, including 
their smartphone offerings, to enterprise 
(SMEs) and corporate customers, with each 
expecting high growth sales in this market 
segment (“AmAssurance, DiGi bantu ejen 
insurans”, 2008; “Cover Story..”, 2009; 
DiGi.Com Berhad, 2009b; Goh, 2007a; 
Koh, 2010; Loke, 2010; Tan, 2009). 
While the broadband service market 
was a challenging one for mobile phone 
companies due to the large number of 
competitors, including Wi-Fi, WiMAX, or 
fixed providers like TM, as a group, these 
mobile phone companies still had the upper 
hand against other groups of broadband 
service provider. Most importantly, their 
monopoly on the mobile service through 
which they offered their smartphones 
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packages (which had Internet services 
embedded into the customers’ mobile 
phone services), enabled them to conquer 
the Internet market as well. These were 
more ubiquitous technologies compared to 
the cumbersome PC-based Internet access 
technologies, which were the most common 
media utilized by Malaysian customers 
to access Internet broadband services 
(Yeap, 2009b). In any case, all broadband 
service providers were under pressure to 
improve their services, as the government 
was planning to have a 100% broadband 
coverage for the entire country by the 
year 2015. Among others, the Malaysian 
government had offered many inducements 
and tax-relief plans to both broadband 
service operators and their customers (Kong, 
2009). These actions were expected to 
rapidly increase broadband service usage 
in the near future, but the main question 
remains if mobile phone providers would 
emerge as the big winner.
B y  t h e  e n d  o f  2 0 1 0 ,  t h e 
telecommunications war appeared to have 
moved into customers’ home (after years of 
intense rivalry in mobile services) with the 
availability of the High Speed Fixed Line 
Broadband technologies. This started with 
UniFi, which was offered by the incumbent 
Telekom Malaysia Berhad in March 2010, 
and was quickly followed by Maxis at the 
end of 2010. On the whole, the mobile phone 
companies’ growth during 2010 was mainly 
centered on data and Internet services, with 
their voice businesses maturing. Thus, the 
industry’s future growth is likely to be 
largely driven by customers’ increasing 
demand for Internet and broadband services 
and for ubiquitous Internet access. The 
industry’s hyper competition however, has 
resulted in operators beginning to seek 
collaborative partnerships with each other in 
order to reduce costs, particularly in relation 
to their technology infrastructures. 

